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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
A.

Parties and Amici

The following parties appeared before the district court as plaintiffs and now
appear before this court as appellants: Stop This Insanity, Inc., Stop This Insanity,
Inc. Employee Leadership Fund, Glengary, LLC, Todd Cefaratti, and Ladd
Ehlinger. The following party appeared before the district court as the defendant
and now appears before this court as appellee: Federal Election Commission.
1.

Stop This Insanity, Inc.

Stop This Insanity, Inc. (“STI”) is a 501(c)(4) grassroots membership
association pending approval by the Internal Revenue Service. It solicits funds in
order to provide every American with access to the technology and means to be
engaged and civically responsible citizens and to empower individuals to take
action in their communities to restore our founding principles of individual liberty,
limited government, and free markets. Stop This Insanity, Inc. has no parent
corporation and does not issue any stock.
2.

Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund

Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund (“the Leadership Fund”)
is a separate segregated fund for Stop This Insanity, Inc. It is organized according
to the statutory and regulatory requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (2006). The Leadership Fund was created to
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engage citizens about which political candidates best promote the principles of
individual liberty, limited government, and free markets.
3.

Glengary, LLC

Glengary, LLC is a limited liability corporation located in the State of
Arizona.
4.

Todd Cefaratti

Mr. Todd Cefaratti is a Director and Officer (President) of Stop This
Insanity, Inc. and within the restricted class of the Leadership Fund.
5.

Ladd Ehlinger

Mr. Ladd Ehlinger is not affiliated with Stop This Insanity, Inc. or the
Leadership Fund. He is not a Director or Officer of the organization, nor a
member of the restricted class.
B.

Rulings Under Review

The ruling under review is contained in the Memorandum Opinion on
November 5, 2012, by United States District Court Judge Beryl A. Howell.
C.

Related Cases

This case was originally before the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia as Case No. 1:12-cv-01140. There are no related cases.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The case arises
under the First Amendment, U.S. Const. amend I, the Federal Election Campaign
Act (the “Act”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (2006), and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201. The district court dismissed the complaint on November 6,
2012. On January 2, 2013, the Leadership Fund filed a timely notice of appeal.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether a political committee that is connected to a corporation may solicit
and accept contributions for independent expenditures from the general public in
light of this Court’s pre-Citizens United ruling that non-connected political
committees may do so and its post-Citizens United ruling that there is no
government interest in limiting contributions to a group engaging in independent
expenditures.
STATUTES
The relevant statute appears in the Addendum.
INTRODUCTION
With only limited exceptions not at issue here, the government has no
interest in prohibiting any organization, based on its organizational structure, from
raising unlimited amounts of money from the general public to engage in
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independent expenditures expressing political viewpoints. Any such prohibition is
plainly invalid under the First Amendment in light of clear precedent of the
Supreme Court and this Court. The government may, as it does here and is
unchallenged in this case, provide limited restrictions that ensure that an
organization’s funds for use in direct campaign contributions be segregated to
ensure compliance with laws related to such direct campaign contributions. But
that is where the regulatory power ends in the context of restricting political
speech.
Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund (the “Leadership Fund”)
is a political organization that is connected to a corporation. It may raise money
from certain corporate employees and their family members (the “restricted
class”), and it may use that money to fund direct campaign contributions or
independent expenditures or other political speech and activities. By statute, the
Leadership Fund may only solicit and accept contributions from the restricted
class. But the statute is unconstitutional as applied here.
The Leadership Fund, compliant with principles supporting restrictions on
direct campaign contributions, intends to open a separate bank account into which
it intends to solicit and receive unlimited contributions from the general public, and
from which it intends to engage only in independent expenditures and other speech
not in the form of campaign contributions (“non-contribution expenditures”). The
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Federal Election Commission threatens to use regulations limiting the Leadership
Fund’s practices with respect to direct campaign contributions in order to prohibit
it from using this separate bank account for non-contribution expenditures and
related activities.
Such a prohibition does not comport with precedent. Indeed, this Court has
recognized both that (1) the government cannot prohibit non-connected political
committees from operating as a “hybrid” organization, in which it engages in both
direct contributions—which are subject to certain restrictions—and other
expenditures for political speech, provided that the non-profit political committee
segregates its restricted funds in a separate bank account, and (2) the only
recognized governmental interest in restricting political speech, the anti-corruption
interest, still applies to direct contributions after Citizens United, but it does not
justify restrictions on non-contribution expenditures. The ineluctable conclusion
after these rulings and Citizens United’s recognition that organizational structure
cannot justify political speech restrictions is that a connected committee—which is
a distinct legal entity—has just as much right to solicit and receive contributions
for independent expenditures as a non-connected committee.
The district court disagreed based on a narrow view of the First Amendment
that expressly contravenes binding Supreme Court precedent. The district court
prefaced its analysis by stating Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United v. FEC,
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130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), was correct to assert that the majority’s holding (that the
government may not suppress political speech through independent expenditures
on the basis of the speaker’s identity as a corporation absent the appearance of or
actual quid pro quo corruption) did “not accord with theory or reality of politics.”
JA235. The court then continued on with analysis that, grounded in a dissent
rather than a majority opinion, was legally erroneous and otherwise failed to apply
the law as determined by the Supreme Court. Thus, the decision below should be
reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Federal Election Campaign Act And Separate Segregated
Funds.

Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (the “Act”), a political committee
may register as an organization called a separate segregated fund (“SSF”).1 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b). SSFs are connected to other organizations, such as corporations
or labor unions, and they are limited both in their methods of obtaining funding
and in the content and character of their speech. 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
An SSF cannot receive any contribution from any corporation or union that
is not its connected organization, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).2 And money that an SFF can

1

A separate segregated fund is also referred to as a “connected committee.”

2

The connected entity may provide money for expenses, but that also is not
considered a “contribution” under applicable law.
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receive from individuals is capped by two restrictions: (1) contributions to
any single SSF are, as with all PACs limited to $5,000 a year, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(C); and (2) contributions to all SSFs in the aggregate cannot exceed
$48,600, as indexed to inflation, per two year period, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3). The
Act also prohibits SSFs from soliciting the general public; it may only solicit the
statutory “restricted class” of its organization, a small subset of individuals related
to the connected organization, like stockholders, members, and certain categories
of employees. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(4)(B)-(C).3
Other organizations—including non-connected political action committees,
unions, and corporations themselves—as well as individuals are not subject to
these burdens on funding for non-contribution expenditures. JA46-47, 228.
B.

The Leadership Fund, An SSF, Decides to Speak Out On Political
Matters.

Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund (“the Leadership Fund”)
is a political committee formed as an SSF. JA36. Its connected organization is
Stop This Insanity, Inc. (“STI”), a small social welfare organization that does not
make political expenditures or contributions. JA214-15. The Leadership Fund
was founded by employees of Stop This Insanity, Inc. to increase civic engagement

3

Some individuals connected to restricted class members may also be solicited,
subject to additional restrictions. For clarity and ease of reference, this brief refers
to the “restricted class” as all people who may be solicited for contributions.
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and promote American values. It does not coordinate any of its expenditure
activities with candidates or political party committees or their agents. JA17.
The Leadership Fund currently maintains a direct contribution bank account
subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the Act.
JA215. It seeks to further political speech on relevant issues by opening a separate
non-contribution account and then using funds raised for that account to engage in
non-contribution expenditures. JA216. And plaintiffs Glengary LLC and Ladd
Ehlinger both seek to make contributions to the Leadership Fund in excess of
current statutory limits for the sole purpose of advancing the Leadership Fund’s
ability to engage in non-contribution expenditures. JA236. Thus, a “noncontribution account” would allow the Leadership Fund to solicit and receive
contributions from outside of the restricted class and use those funds for speech
such as independent expenditures, issue ads, and get-out-the-vote drives, but not to
provide contributions to candidates.4 JA215-16. The Leadership Fund does not
dispute that contributions and expenditures from this account would be subject to
the reporting requirements at 2 U.S.C. § 434(a), 11 C.F.R. § 100.19, and 11 C.F.R.
§ 104.4. The traditional or “direct contribution” bank account would continue to
be used for directly contributing to federal candidates. JA216. It also would

4

The district court referred to non-contribution accounts, also commonly referredto as “Carey accounts,” as “independent expenditure-only accounts.”
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continue to be subject to the existing limits, source restrictions, and reporting
requirements. JA215-16.
C.

The Commission Splits On Whether The Amount And Source
Restrictions And Solicitation Prohibition Apply To The
Leadership Fund In Light Of Citizens United.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010), and this Court’s decisions in EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2009) and SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the
Leadership Fund believed that its First Amendment rights permit it to operate a
“hybrid” PAC—one with a restricted account and a separate non-contribution
account. JA11-12. But the Leadership Fund believed that it risked prosecution
under the Act if it established a second bank account to solicit contributions from
outside the restricted class even if those funds were solely used through a
segregated account. JA18. To alleviate its concerns, the Leadership Fund
submitted an advisory opinion request to the Federal Election Commission (the
“Commission”). JA31-34, 216. The request asked whether “a connected PAC”
may establish a non-contribution account “to solicit and accept contributions from
the general public, corporations, and unions not subject to the restrictions of 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) and 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B).” JA41; JA216. The next
month, the Commission issued two opposing draft advisory opinions. JA41-71,
217.
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Draft Advisory Opinion A (“Draft A”), relying on this Court’s decisions in
EMILY’s List and SpeechNow.org concluded that the Leadership Fund could
“establish a non-contribution account and solicit and accept unlimited
contributions from individuals, other political committees, corporations, and labor
organizations” in addition to STI and its restricted class, provided that the
Leadership Fund continue to adhere to the existing restrictions on soliciting
employees. JA42. Draft A also looked to the Commission’s recent consent
judgment in Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011), which stated that
the Commission would no longer enforce regulatory provisions that “prohibit nonconnected political committees from accepting contributions from corporations and
labor organizations” nor “limit the amounts permissible sources may contribute to
such accounts.” JA46.
That SSFs operate differently than non-connected committees did not
matter. Though SSFs can have their administrative costs paid by the connected
organization, Draft A stated that the differences between the two structures did not
create a different risk of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption.
JA46-47. Accordingly, there was no compelling government interest in restricting
the Leadership Fund’s ability to organize itself as a “hybrid” political committee
that would operate one account to accept direct contribution funds and a second,
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separate account to receive unlimited contributions for independent expenditures.
JA48.
Draft Advisory Opinion B (“Draft B”) claimed that the reasoning in
EMILY’s List, SpeechNow, and Carey could not be applied to connected
committees. JA64-65. Opinion B emphasized the differences between connected
and non-connected political committees—in particular, the connected committee’s
ability to have administrative costs paid by the organization to which it was
connected without disclosing such costs. JA65-66. Thus, the contribution
restrictions were purportedly constitutionally permissible. JA70. Opinion B found
the second issue, the solicitation prohibition, was moot in light of how it resolved
the first. JA71.
The Commission later certified that it failed on a vote of 3-3 to approve
either of the advisory opinions. JA73. Accordingly, no four-vote, binding
advisory opinion was issued, and the Leadership Fund remained at risk for
prosecution if it opened a non-contribution account. JA14.
D.

The Leadership Fund Silences Itself For Fear of Prosecution And
Seeks Declaratory Judgment.

Based on the Commission’s failure to issue a binding advisory opinion, the
Leadership Fund abstained from speech during the 2012 election season in order to
avoid prosecution. See JA18. Due to its small restricted class and the Act’s
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restrictions on its speech and association, the Leadership Fund could not raise
sufficient funds to run non-contribution expenditure campaigns. JA18.
In June 2012, the Leadership Fund and other appellants filed a complaint
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Commission from
enforcing portions of the Act as applied to them. JA4.
The Leadership Fund moved for a preliminary injunction shortly thereafter.
JA79. In response, the Commission moved for dismissal as a matter of law,
asserting that “Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a constitutional right to make
unrestricted solicitations to STI’s employees and the public for STI’s SSF because
“Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a constitutional right to finance such
communications in a manner that would render them exempt from the disclosure
rules applicable to every other PAC engaging in similar engineering.” JA187, 188.
In support, the Commission cited the portions of the decisions in Citizens United
and SpeechNow upholding as constitutionally permissible certain disclosure
requirements that SSFs are, in fact, not subject to. JA186-87. The Leadership
Fund responded that it only asserted First Amendment rights consistent with other
PACs, and it is Congress’s role, not the courts, to impose the same disclosure
requirements on SSFs, if it chooses to do so. JA197-99. The Leadership Fund
argued that Congress’s failure to regulate an activity—particularly one protected
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under the First Amendment—does not render the unregulated actions
constitutionally unprotected. JA199-203.
On November 6, 2012, the district court disposed of both motions through
an order denying the Leadership Fund’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss. JA212. The court recognized it was
“not the [c]ourt’s prerogative to question the authority of” the Supreme Court and
this Court’s decisions in Citizens United, EMILY’s List, and SpeechNow. JA221.
It further acknowledged that this Court, in EMILY’s List, “endorsed the
hybridization of political committees—at least when such political committees are
not connected to a candidate, political party, corporation, or labor union.” JA229.
But relying heavily on Justice Stevens’ “piercing dissent” in Citizens United, the
court went on to rule that “[w]hen a single entity is allowed to make both limited
and direct contributions and unlimited independent expenditures, keeping the bank
accounts for those two purposes separate is simply insufficient to overcome the
appearance that the entity is in cahoots with the candidates and parties that it
coordinates with and supports.” JA240-41; see also JA235. The court pushed
further, stating that the reasoning underlying constitutional protection for
“‘hybrid’” political committees “is naïve and simply out of touch with the
American public’s clear disillusionment with the massive amounts of private
money that have dominated the political system, particularly since Citizens
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United.” JA241. For that reason, it ruled that the contribution and solicitation
restrictions do not violate the First Amendment, as applied to the Leadership Fund.
JA250.
On January 2, 2013 the Leadership Fund timely filed a notice of appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Leadership Fund is a political committee founded to increase civic
engagement. It seeks to engage in collective speech through both (1) direct
contributions to political candidates and (2) non-contribution expenditures for its
own speech. The Leadership Fund is not directly associated with any candidate or
political party. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United
individuals, corporations, unions, and non-profit political advocacy committees can
engage in unlimited non-contribution expenditures. SSFs like the Leadership
Fund, however, do not currently have clarity—or guidance from the
Commission—regarding their ability to exercise their own First Amendment rights
fully due to contribution and solicitation restrictions in the Act.
As applied, the Act regulates the Leadership Fund’s ability to engage in
political speech and association in two ways pertinent to this appeal: by limiting
who may be solicited for contributions, and by regulating the amounts and sources
of contributions. The Leadership Fund is subject to these restrictions based solely
upon its status as a “connected” political action committee, or SSF, meaning it is
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connected to another organization like a corporation or labor union. Other
organizations—including non-connected political action committees, unions, and
corporations themselves—as well as individuals are not subject to these
restrictions. And as a result of these regulations restricting its right to associate,
the Leadership fund is unable to finance non-contribution expenditures—speech—
that it would otherwise engage in.
Laws that burden political speech and association—as do the restrictions
that, as applied to the Leadership Fund, disallow a separate, non-contribution
account—are subject to strict scrutiny. The government must demonstrate a
compelling government interest for the restrictions and that the regulations are
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. But because the government has no valid
interest to justify to the speech restrictions at issue here, they fail any constitutional
test. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, the only recognized
compelling government interest for restrictions on campaign-related speech and
associated financing activity is preventing apparent or actual quid pro quo
corruption—the “anti-corruption interest.” But as articulated by both the Supreme
Court in Citizens United and this Court in EMILY’s List and SpeechNow, the risk
of a quid pro quo exchange is absent when a speaker engages in non-contribution
expenditures. Contributions to a political committee that engages in non-
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contribution expenditures and solicitations for such contributions similarly do not
implicate the anti-corruption interest.
This Court held in EMILY’s List that the government cannot prohibit nonconnected political committees from creating what amounts to a “hybrid”
organization (in which a single political committee engages in both restricted
expenditures and expenditures that are not regulated by the FEC) provided that the
non-profit political committee maintains its funds in two separate bank accounts.
581 F.3d at 12. This Court found that there was no risk of quid pro quo corruption
simply by allowing EMILY’s List to also engage in non-contribution expenditures
and maintain a bank account for those expenditures. The holding did not address
connected committees because it was issued prior to Citizens United. After the
Supreme Court held that a speaker’s organizational structure could not support
restrictions on speech in Citizens United, applying this Court’s reasoning in
EMILY’s List to connected political committees is both natural and necessary.
The district court erred in its analysis on whether the contribution limits met
a compelling government interest here. It conflated the legitimate and compelling
anti-corruption interest with the rejected equalization and anti-distortion interests.
Rather than address whether the restrictions prevented either corruption or the
appearance of corruption, the court focused on a statutory exemption that allows
the connected entity to pay the administrative costs of an SSF without disclosing
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those costs. But that fact is irrelevant to whether the speech restrictions violate the
First Amendment. It is not the Judiciary’s role to determine whether
Congressional policy choices regarding which disclosures to demand give a
speaker an unfair advantage justifying a muzzle. Under Citizens United, no
particular organizational form among political speakers justifies a muzzle. The
district court’s concern that, by having its administrative costs paid by a connected
corporation, SSFs have unbalanced speaking power does not involve a government
interest against quid pro quo corruption at all. Instead, it solely raises the
previously-rejected equalization interest.
For similar reasons, the district court erred in upholding the solicitation
restrictions. The power to solicit contributions to fund non-contribution activity is
subject to the same protections as the power to provide contributions and the power
to use the contributions to speak independently about candidates for office. Thus,
the government interest against quid pro quo corruption has no relevance to the
solicitation restrictions here. Additionally, the solicitation restrictions do not
advance any anti-coercion interest as applied here. Even assuming employee
coercion is a legitimate interest, prohibiting SSFs from soliciting non-employees
does not advance that interest. The Leadership Fund seeks only to solicit third
parties and the general public. It does not seek to skirt the limitations on
solicitations of members of the restricted class. Third party and general public
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solicitations would not have a coercive effect on the connected corporation’s
employees and to the extent solicitation restrictions are applied to outlaw such
solicitations, they are unconstitutional. Moreover, the restrictions are redundant—
a separate provision of the Act prohibits coercion. Therefore, invalidating the
solicitation restrictions as applied here will not permit a corporation or a connected
committee to threaten, retaliate against, or terminate employees of the corporation.
The district court, in apparent disagreement with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United, upheld contribution and solicitation restrictions based
on purportedly compelling interests that have already been rejected by the Supreme
Court. For that reason and more, the district court’s order dismissing this case and
denying the Leadership Fund’s motion for a preliminary injunction should be
reversed with directions to enter the preliminary injunction requested by the
Leadership Fund.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Rudder v.
Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2012). A court “must assume all the
allegations in the complaint are true [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21
November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a denial of a preliminary
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injunction, the Court reviews the denial for abuse of discretion, but any legal
conclusions de novo. Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
ARGUMENT
I.

RESTRICTING THE LEADERSHIP FUND’S RIGHT TO SOLICIT,
RECEIVE, AND MAKE INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ABRIDGES ITS POLITICAL SPEECH
RIGHTS BASED ON ITS ORGANIZATIONAL FORM.
A.

The Leadership Fund’s Independent Rights To Associate and
Engage In Political Speech May Not Be Abridged Based On Its
Organizational Form.

Restrictions on the Leadership Fund’s ability to solicit and receive
contributions to engage in independent expenditures implicate fundamental speech
and association rights. Political expression is “at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976)
(citations omitted). Included in this core are contributions and expenditures about
political campaigns. See EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d at 5 (citing Buckley, 424
U.S. at 14). Indeed, the First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent
application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)). As such, “political speech must prevail against
laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.” Id. at 881.
The First Amendment prohibits restrictions on political speech that
distinguish among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. Id.
- 17 -

at 883 (“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”).
Such restrictions may operate as a means to control content and deprive the nonpreferred speaker “the right to use speech to establish worth, standing, and respect
for the speaker’s voice.” Id. at 899. The Supreme Court has thus only recognized
one narrow exception to the prohibition against identity-based distinctions—when
the government performs a uniquely governmental function in limited settings,
such as special restrictions within the military, corrections systems, and public
schools. See id. (cataloguing cases).
The First Amendment protects not only an individual’s political speech
rights, but associational rights as well. And collective speech is no less protected
because it comes from an association of individuals rather than a single individual.
See id. at 904; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)
(stating that the worth of speech “does not depend on the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union or individual”). As such, the government
cannot make speech-based restrictions because the speaker is an association rather
than an individual. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900.
The government also may not restrict an association’s political speech based
on how it chooses to organize itself. In determining the degree of First
Amendment protection, it is irrelevant whether the speaker organizes itself as a
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corporation, an association, a union, or otherwise. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777
(“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public
does not depend on the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual.”); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S.
1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”) (quotation and
marks omitted). Simply put, the government cannot penalize “certain disfavored
associations of citizens” because they opt for a particular organizational form.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
These principles, most recently articulated in Citizens United, extend to
political committees like SSFs, which are simply collections of individuals
grouping together to engage in political speech, see 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (defining
political committee), separately from the organizations to which they are
connected, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“A PAC is a separate association
from the corporation.”), and independently from any candidates or political parties.
Thus, the connected organization’s ability to speak is not an excuse to restrict
contributions to the SSF. It is a separate association, with separate rights to engage
in political speech. See id. (holding that “Section 441b is ban on corporate speech
notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak”
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because a PAC is a separate association from the corporation and thus, the PAC’s
own ability to speak “does not allow corporations to speak”).
In EMILY’s List v. FEC, this Court considered FEC regulations that required
some associations to fund expenditures through accounts—called “hard money
accounts”—subject to source and amount restrictions. See 581 F.3d at 5, 16-18
(describing the regulations). EMILY’s List agreed that direct contributions to
candidates and administrative expenses should be paid out of its hard money
account, but wanted to use a separate account to make other expenditures.
This Court concluded that “hybrid PACs”—political committees engaging in
both direct contributions and non-contribution expenditures—like EMILY’s List
are constitutionally protected from restrictions on non-contribution expenditures.
In so holding, the Court noted that making direct contributions does not somehow
pollute the independence of the non-contribution expenditures. Id. at 12.
Maintaining separate accounts was the appropriate method of maintaining the
independence necessary to avoid the anti-corruption interest. See id. at 18. Thus,
the regulations were invalid. Id.
The district court distinguished EMILY’s List based on the fact that
EMILY’s List was a non-connected organization. JA229-30. But that was error.
EMILY’s List—decided while Citizens United was pending—came against the
backdrop of a legal regime that still allowed speech restrictions based on
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organizational form. See EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 7 (identifying as an
“overarching principle of relevance” that “the Court has been more tolerant of
regulation of for-profit corporations and labor unions”). At that time, the
prevailing reading of precedent supported a belief that SSFs implicated an antidistortion interest due to their association with their connected organizations. See
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 688 (1990) (applying the
anti-distortion interest to corporations).
But Citizens United overturned Austin and eliminated distinctions between
“non-profit” and “for-profit,” and between “non-connected” and “connected.”
Compare EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 7-8 (using as one of its guiding principles that
“the Court has upheld laws that prohibit for-profit corporations and unions from
making expenditures for activities expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
federal candidate”) (citing Austin, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)) with Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 913 (“Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin should be and now
is overruled. We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”).
Some types of connected political committees still raise valid anti-corruption
concerns. For example, national political parties are so closely associated with the

- 21 -

candidates that the anti-corruption interest is still implicated. See EMILY’S List at
14 (discussing the national political parties “inherent relationship with federal
candidates and officeholders”). But other connected political committees do not
raise these concerns. SSFs are not so closely connected with a candidate, and they
certainly are no more closely connected with a candidate than non-connected
PACs. And after Citizens United, any interests in anti-distortion or anti-corruption
because of an affiliation with a corporation or labor union are invalid.
EMILY’s List and Citizens United establish that any speaker that is not
directly associated with a candidate or political party has a First Amendment right
to make contributions without giving up the right to make unlimited uncoordinated
political expenditures.
But the district court cast EMILY’s List aside, ruling that the structure of
SSFs rendered them vulnerable to restrictions on their speech and that the
contribution and solicitation restrictions were valid. JA224-25, 240-42, 249-50. It
resolved that “SSFs are creatures of statute” and thus, they are at the whim of
Congress on what constitutional rights they may exercise. JA250. Throughout its
opinion, the district court attempts to distinguish SSFs from non-connected
committees and other organizational forms by asserting that “there is a major
statutory trade-off for SSFs”; namely, “that an SSF can have all of its
administrative and solicitations costs paid for by its connected corporation and
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need not report the amount or source of those funds, but in order to enjoy those
financial, non-disclosure, and non-reporting benefits the SSF must limit its
solicitation base.” JA222-23. Therefore, the court asserts, it is “eminently
reasonable and important for connected PACs to abide by Congress’s
countervailing restriction on the universe of people to whom SSFs’ solicitations
may be directed” under 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). JA250. To hold otherwise,
“would allow the disclosure and reporting exception to swallow the rule.” Id.
But this reasoning ignores the bedrock constitutional principle that the
government cannot exact as the price of a benefit the surrender of First
Amendment rights. See Pickering v. Board of Educ. Twp. High School, 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968) (rejecting that “teachers may constitutionally be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the
public schools in which they work”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)
(holding that because a tax exemption is a “privilege” or “bounty” does not
preclude its denial from constituting an impermissible infringement of speech).
After Citizens United, the exemptions passed by Congress 37 years ago may allow
SSFs to “have their cake and eat it too,” JA251, but neither the district court nor
the Commission may craft opinions or regulatory interpretations that create a
solicitation regime that they believe Congress “would have wanted” following
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Citizens United. Rather, if the exemptions create anomalous results after Citizens
United, it is Congress’s role to fashion the appropriate balances among statutory—
and not constitutional—rights.
Moreover, the district court’s resolution rests on the fallacy that the
Leadership Fund can, with no greater burden, create another political action
committee rather than open up a separate bank account. JA242 n.25. But that is
beside the point. The Leadership Fund has its own First Amendment rights. And
there can be no dispute that they are burdened by restricting contributions and
solicitations. The First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting
political speech by distinguishing among speakers based solely on their identity (or
corporate form). Thus, the court’s assertion that SSFs are “completely unnecessary
to allow the plaintiffs to engage in unlimited independent expenditures,
individually or together,” JA224, is a constitutionally infirm justification under the
First Amendment.
Requiring the Leadership Fund to clone itself to make independent
expenditures—rather than allow the Leadership Fund to use a non-contribution
account—is proof of the burden. The availability of avenues “more burdensome
than the one foreclosed is ‘sufficient to characterize [a regulatory interpretation] as
an infringement on First Amendment activities.’” Austin, 494 U.S. at 708
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
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479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986) (“MCFL”)). The additional requirements of creating a
second political committee “may create a disincentive for [plaintiffs] to engage in
political speech. Detailed record-keeping and disclosure obligations, along with
the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administrative
costs that many small entities may be unable to bear. Furthermore, such duties
require a far more complex and formalized organization than many small groups
could manage.” MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254-55. See also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 897 (establishing a PAC is burdensome); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263 (“While the
burden on MCFL’s speech [establishing a political committee] is not
insurmountable, we cannot permit it to be imposed without a constitutionally
adequate justification.”).
Indeed, if the onerous ability to disband and reform or create a second more
favored organizational structure is all that justifies restricting speech absent a
compelling interest, it is surprising that the Supreme Court in Citizens United did
not justify the corporate independent expenditure bans because the individuals
forming the corporation could merely disband it and engage in the same speech if
they acted as individuals. Similarly, at the time Citizens United was decided, the
Citizens United organization operated an SSF for a decade and made candidate
contributions. But this did not prevent the Court in Citizens United from implicitly
rejecting Justice Stevens’s position that if Citizens United wanted to speak right
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before the primary, all it needed to do was “abjure business contributions or use the
funds in its PAC, which by its own account is “one of the most active conservative
PACs in America.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 944 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, the availability of other organizational forms to speak through did not justify
the independent expenditure restrictions in Citizens United, and it should not
justify the restrictions here.
It is of no moment that SSFs are “creatures of statute.” Corporations are
creatures of statue and non-connected PACs are creatures of statute. The Supreme
Court expressly held in Citizens United that corporations’ status as organizations
does not limit their rights to free speech or give Congress free reign to muzzle
them in exchange for the benefits received. Nor would it be reasonable to allow
Congress unfettered discretion to limit non-connected PACs’ ability to solicit and
receive contributions if Congress simply chose to exempt some contributions from
disclosure. By the same token, connected committees do not cede their First
Amendment rights simply by organizing in a way that allows them to receive
operating expenses from another organization without disclosing the amount of
operating expenses they receive. And if that creates an “unfair” advantage, it is
Congress’s role, not the Judiciary’s, to eliminate the “advantage” through methods
that do not squelch the fundamental rights to speech and association to which SSFs
and their contributors are entitled.
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B.

No Government Interest Exists to Restrict The Leadership Fund’s
Right To Engage In Political Speech Through Non-Contribution
Expenditures.

Focusing on organizational structure, the district court lost sight of the
critical inquiry—what interest the government has in restricting the Leadership
Fund’s exercise of its First Amendment rights. It has none. “Laws that burden
political speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.))
(quotation marks omitted). In the context of restricting political speech in
connection with campaign financing, the Supreme Court has only recognized one
interest that may outweigh the First Amendment interests: preventing quid pro quo
corruption or the appearance of such corruption (the “anti-corruption interest”).
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 692.
The anti-corruption interest was first recognized in Buckley v. Valeo and
used to sustain a limit on direct contributions to political candidates. See Buckley,
424 U.S. at 24-26. Because of the close coordination between the political
candidate and the contributor, the Supreme Court reasoned that direct contributions
could be given “to secure a political quid pro quo” and that “the scope of such
pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained.” Id. at 27. That interest was
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limited to quid pro quo corruption. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10. The
appearance of favoritism and influence do not justify restrictions on political
speech. Id. Rather, “[r]eliance on a generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at
odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and
susceptible to no limiting principle.” Id. at 910 (quotation and marks omitted).
Several other purported governmental interests to justify restrictions on
independent expenditures have been analyzed and rejected over time. Equalizing
differing viewpoints has never been a legitimate interest. See Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. at 904 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741-42 (2008)). Neither has
protecting competing views of members within an association. See id.; see also
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95 (stating that shareholders may engage in corporate
democracy to direct the view of a corporation, and are presumed competent to
protect their own interests). The Supreme Court overruled any reliance on an
“anti-distortion interest”—the theory that the government has an interest in
preventing the effects of “immense aggregation of wealth” might have on public
support for ideas—in Citizens United. See id. at 904-05. And this Court sitting en
banc in SpeechNow dismissed an “informational interest” in ‘“identifying the
sources of support for and opposition to’ a political position or candidate” as “not
enough to justify the First Amendment burden.” SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 692.
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Indeed, the only governmental interest supporting restrictions on political
speech is the anti-corruption interest. Id. But that interest is not implicated by
non-contribution expenditures. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. Independent
expenditures, by definition, are completely un-coordinated with any candidate or
party. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006) (“The term ‘independent expenditure’ means an
expenditure by a person (A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at
the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political
committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”). Other
non-contribution expenditures involve even less concern about corruption and have
traditionally been considered less regulable.5 JA237-38. Because they are
uncoordinated, private speakers cannot make non-contribution expenditures as a
corrupting “quid” for a politician’s corrupt “quo.” See SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at
694-95; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. (“independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption”).
Despite the unequivocal rejection of the anti-distortion and equalization
interests as justifications for restrictions on independent expenditures, the district
court relied on these interests without qualification to fashion an exception to the
5

As a practical matter, any First Amendment protection independent expenditures
receive also applies to other non-contribution expenditures.
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holdings in Citizens United, EMILY’s List, and SpeechNow. JA225 (antidistortion: “[O]fficials with control of the money spigot at the connected
corporation can completely dominate the operations and contribution policies of
the SSF.”); JA224 (equalization: “In this manner, political committees would be
able to influence the electoral process to an extent disproportionate to their public
support and far greater than the individual or group that finances the committee’s
operations would be able to do acting alone.”). And it relied on the plainly
inapplicable anti-corruption interest.
The district court improperly distinguished SSFs from other political
committees and then, because of these purported differences, justified creating an
unsupported carve-out from the uncontroverted principle that independent
expenditures do not implicate the anti-corruption interest. Indeed, to support this
novelty, the district court relied on the dissent in Citizens United—the very
analysis the majority rejected in finding that the anti-corruption interest cannot
justify restrictions on independent expenditures. JA235 (“the ‘belief that quid pro
quo arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does
not accord with the theory or reality of politics.’” (quoting Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting))); JA240 (stating that allowing organizations to
provide both direct contributions and make independent expenditures “is naïve and
simply out of touch with the American public’s clear disillusionment with the
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massive amounts of private money that have dominated the political system,
particularly since Citizens United” (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 964
(Stevens, J., dissenting))). Thus, the district court’s carve-out of SSFs from the
constitutional protections other PACs and organizations enjoy is wholly
unsupported by the jurisprudence of both the Supreme Court and this Court.
II.

THE RESTRICTIONS ON SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SSFs VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AS APPLIED TO PROHIBIT CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NONCONTRIBUTION ACCOUNT.
A.

Source Restrictions Are Subject To Strict Scrutiny.

Under any standard, the government does not have any interest sufficient to
justify restricting SSFs from receiving contributions from contributor outside of
the restricted class, or the amounts of the contributions, for the purpose of
engaging in non-contribution expenditures. Laws, like these restrictions, that
“burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the
government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898
(quotation and marks omitted). But the Court need not resolve which level of
scrutiny is applicable because the government cannot provide a sufficient interest
for the restrictions here under any test. See SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 696 (applying
that methodology).
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B.

The Anti-Corruption Interest Does Not Apply To NonContribution Expenditures And May Not Be Used To Justify The
Source Restrictions As Applied To The Leadership Fund.

The Supreme Court has recognized only one interest that justifies
restrictions on contributions for political speech: the anti-corruption interest.
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 695. And the anti-corruption interest is not implicated by
non-contribution expenditures—whether in making them or receiving contributions
for them. See id. at 692-93; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. The Supreme
Court and this Court have also held that limits on contributions to groups that make
independent expenditures are necessarily restrictions on their expenditures. See
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981);
EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Combined, these principles
demonstrate that the anti-corruption interest cannot justify the limits for funding
non-contribution expenditures as applied to the Leadership Fund. Thus, as applied
here, the source restrictions prohibiting the Leadership Fund from receiving
contributions from outside of the restricted class fail any test of constitutionality.
“All that matters is that the First Amendment cannot be encroached upon for
naught.” SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 695.
In SpeechNow, a nonprofit association that intended to engage in express
advocacy sought a ruling that limits on contributions to the organization were
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 689. At the outset, the Court recognized that in
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order to regulate financing of political advocacy, the government “must have a
countervailing interest that outweighs the limit’s burden on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” Id. at 692. It then noted that the Supreme Court has rejected
all purported governmental interests “suggested as a justification for contribution
or expenditure limits” except the interest against corruption or the appearance of
corruption. Id. Those rejected interests include equalization, identification of
sources of funds, and anti-distortion. Id.
Because the contributions sought were solely for financing independent
expenditures, the anti-corruption interest was not implicated. Id. at 694-95 (“In
light of the Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not
corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to
groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the
appearance of corruption.”). Thus, the contribution limits were invalid under any
standard.
That the Leadership Fund would also make direct contributions from a
separate, highly regulated account does not change this analysis. Citizens United,
EMILY’s List, and SpeechNow concluded that making non-contribution
expenditures, receiving contributions to make non-contribution expenditures, and
separately making direct contributions in addition to non-contribution expenditures
do not implicate the anti-corruption interest beyond the direct contributions
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themselves. Though the cases’ holdings invalidated the restrictions as applied to
specific types of speakers (i.e. nonprofit associations), their reasoning is not
limited solely to the particular organizational form at issue in those cases. Rather,
the only identity-based exception that can be supported for political committees is
one for committees directly associated with a candidate or political party.
EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 7. And of course political parties have far different
relationships with candidates than SSFs. Indeed, the candidates run for office in
their parties’ names.
“[C]ontributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also
cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at
695. It follows—as the FEC has recognized6—that contributions to bank accounts
that make only independent expenditures and other non-contribution expenditures
cannot corrupt elected government officials or create the appearance of corruption
either. That much is clear in this Court’s holding in EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 19,
that, so long as the organization maintained separate accounts for independent
expenditures and direct contributions, an organization could not, consistent with
the First Amendment, be prohibited in engaging in non-contribution expenditures.

6

See, e.g., FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC: Reporting Guidance for Political
Committees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/Press2011/20111006postcarey.shtml.
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The district court already applied these principles to 2 U.S.C.
§§ 441a(a)(1)(c) and 441a(a)(3) in another case and held the anti-corruption
interest inapplicable. In Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011), the
court found that non-connected committees “are not the same as political parties”
and therefore, “do not cause the same concerns of quid pro quo money for access.”
Id. at 131 (emphasis in original). Moreover, even if some compelling interest had
existed, that court—correctly following the Supreme Court—concluded the
restrictions were not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id.
The Commission chose not to appeal. Instead, it entered into a consent
judgment stating that it would “no longer enforce statutory and regulatory
provisions that prohibit non-connected political committees from accepting
contributions from corporations and labor organizations, provided the political
committee maintains and deposits those contributions into a non-contribution
account.”7 Under current Commission enforcement policy, then, non-connected
political committees may engage in unrestricted independent expenditures and
restricted direct contributions.
Despite Carey and the Commission’s agreement to the consent judgment,
the district court in this case concluded that the same principles underlying those
decisions do not apply to the Leadership Fund; rather, the Leadership Fund’s
7

Press Release, Federal Election Commission Statement on Carey v. FEC (Oct. 5,
2011), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/Press2011/20111006postcarey.shtml.
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activities risk an appearance of corruption. JA235-36, 239-41, 247-48. It made
two errors while reaching that conclusion. First, the district court isolated this
Circuit’s holdings in SpeechNow and EMILY’s List from each other and failed to
follow the reasoning that led to each court’s holding. JA236 n.19 (“declin[ing] the
plaintiff’s invitation” to “conclude that the dual-account model supplied by
EMILY’s List for hybrid PACs to be read in tandem with SpeechNow to expand
SpeechNow’s holding to any organization that engages in some amount of
independent expenditure activity.”). Second, it based its analysis on artificial,
inaccurate, and irrelevant distinctions emphasizing the relationship between the
SSF and the connected organization, but failing to identify a distinction that links
SSFs with candidates they purportedly corrupt. As a result, the district court relied
on distinctions that make no difference from either a factual or constitutional
perspective. The three mistaken distinctions it makes are between (1) expenditures
and independent expenditures, (2) connected and non-connected organizations, and
(3) contribution allocation limitations and contribution amount limitations.
The district court distinguished EMILY’s List as involving only
“expenditures” and not “independent expenditures,” which are among the noncontribution expenditures the Leadership Fund intends to make. JA229 n.15
(noting that the EMILY’s List Court was “careful not to use the statutory term of art
‘independent expenditure’ . . . because the plaintiffs in EMILY’s List did not
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engage in any express advocacy communications that would have been considered
‘independent expenditures’”). It also implied that independent expenditures give
rise to corruption. JA239 (“[A]s the Court’s preceding analysis makes clear, the
‘independence’ of hybrid PAC expenditures is suspect.”). It is wrong for three
reasons.
First, the record in EMILY’s List indicates that EMILY’s List did make
independent expenditures. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, EMILY’s List, 581
F.3d 1 (No. 08-5422), 2009 WL 772945 (drawing a comparison between EMILY’s
List and a political committee in a previous case because they both “made
independent expenditures to influence federal elections”). Second, the term
“expenditure”—both in EMILY’s List and generally—includes independent
expenditures. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (“expenditure” is “any purchase, payment . . .
or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office.”). See also EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 9 (describing a
right to make unlimited expenditures as the right to “raise and spend unlimited
money in support of candidates for elected office”). Thus, the reasoning that
applies to expenditures applies to all expenditures, including independent
expenditures. Finally, the Court quoted cases that specifically addressed
independent expenditures to support its reasoning regarding expenditures
generally. EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 9 (citing Cal-Med., 453 U.S. at 203); id. at 11
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(citing N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 292 (4th Cir. 2008)). All of
EMILY’s List’s reasoning about expenditures applies to independent expenditures.
Holding to the contrary is like animal control refusing to apply a leash law on a
bulldog because the law uses the term “dogs,” but not “bulldogs.”
The district court’s distinction between “allocation restrictions” and
“contribution limits” is also a distinction without a difference. The allocation
restrictions in EMILY’s List acted as contribution limits. For instance, one
provision forced certain political committees “to use their hard-money accounts to
pay 100% of the costs of advertisements or other communications that ‘refer’ to a
federal candidate.” EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 17. By “allocating” the expenditure
to the hard money account—a term used to identify an account that is subject to
contribution limitations—the regulation effectively limited the receipts for that
purpose. Allocation restrictions channel money into accounts that limit how much
political committees can raise from contributors. The effect of limiting
contributions is the problem, not the separation into a specific bank account.
The non-connected versus connected distinction does not matter either. The
district court dedicates a lengthy footnote to distinguishing EMILY’s List, JA237
n.21, and a briefer one to distinguish SpeechNow, JA239 n.23, on this ground.
Rather than explore why this Court viewed connected PACs and non-connected
PACs differently in those cases, the district court did “not venture to speculate as
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to the doctrinal importance of the non-connected nature.” JA237 n.21. The
doctrinal importance is clear though. As previously explained, the reason that
connected status mattered when EMILY’s List was decided was because Austin
authorized differentiating among speakers based on organizational structure. See
supra, § 1.A. But Austin was overturned in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913,
which expressly held that such discrimination among speakers based on
organizational identity is unconstitutional.
Finally, the district court erred by finding that there is an appearance of
corruption because the independent layperson may not be aware that the entity’s
spending comes from two separate bank accounts. This contradicts the court’s
recommendation that the Leadership Fund clone itself to create a separate action
committee engaging in the same activity: the second committee, the court
concedes, could bear essentially the same name, which would not alter the
perception of the layperson. JA242-43 n.25. Thus, this reasoning is nothing more
than upholding a political speech restriction based on an organization’s chosen
form—a prohibited, identity-based restriction under the First Amendment.
None of the district court’s distinctions or caveats warrant departing from
the reasoning in EMILY’s List and SpeechNow—let alone binding Supreme Court
precedent—regarding the anti-corruption interest. And the import of those cases is
inescapable. Political committees whose expenditures are made independently
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from political parties or candidates do not pose a risk of quid pro quo corruption or
the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Without that interest, the Commission
cannot justify the burden on the Leadership Fund’s speech.
III.

THE SOLICITATION PROHIBITION FAILS ANY LEVEL OF
SCRUTINY AS APPLIED TO THE LEADERSHIP FUND BECAUSE
IT DOES NOT FURTHER THE ANTI-CORRUPTION OR ANTICOERCION INTERESTS.
A.

Strict Scrutiny Applies To The Solicitation Prohibition.

The Leadership Fund seeks to solicit the general public for contributions to
its non-contribution account—the same right that any non-connected political
committee, business, or individual has. This would allow the Leadership Fund to
engage in collective speech with other private citizens. Current law permits SSFs
to solicit only individuals in a “restricted class,” subject to certain restrictions. See
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (defining the “restricted class” as “any stockholder,
executive or administrative personnel, or employee of a corporation or the families
of such persons” of the connected organization). The Leadership Fund is not
requesting that the Court invalidate the limitations on solicitations directed at those
in the restricted class. Instead it seeks the ability to make generalized
advertisement solicitations and targeted solicitations to individuals unrelated to the
Leadership Fund or its connected organization.
Given its inherent nature as political speech, strict scrutiny should apply to
the solicitation ban. In Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better
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Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), the Court concluded that soliciting financial
support in many contexts was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 833. Any
regulation of solicitation had to be “undertaken with due regard for the reality that
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on
economic, political, or social issues.” Id. at 834.
Thus, the Supreme Court has afforded different levels of protections to
different types of solicitations. For example, a solicitation to engage in unlawful
behavior is completely unprotected. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 579 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also id. at 552 (“[T]he state may prohibit inchoate offenses that attach to
criminal conduct, such as solicitation.”) (O’Connor, J., opinion of the Court).
Solicitations to engage in a purely commercial transaction have received
intermediate scrutiny. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (defining commercial speech as “speech
proposing a commercial transaction” and later applying intermediate scrutiny).
And solicitations for charitable contributions that would be partially used for
charitable purposes and partially to pay salaries warranted a higher level of
scrutiny. Village of Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 637 (permitting regulations that
serve the government’s “legitimate interests . . . by narrowly drawn regulations
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designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms”). Solicitation is not a separate category of speech; it is
both speech and a corollary to speech, and receives at least the same protection as
the type of speech it arises in the context of. E.g., Groden v. Random House, Inc.,
61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995) (dismissing false advertising claim regarding
advertisement of a book). Solicitation for contributions to fund political speech
necessarily involves making protected political speech so that potential
contributors are persuaded to provide funds. Therefore, because the solicitation
prohibition burdens political speech, strict scrutiny applies. See Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 898 (“laws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny”)
(quotation and marks omitted); Blount, 61 F.3d at 941 (“solicitation of political
funds is close to the core of protected speech”).
Solicitations are particularly important to a small group like the Leadership
Fund. Because the Leadership Fund is not connected to a large for-profit
corporation or union, its restricted class is tiny—only seven people and their family
members at the time of the Advisory Opinion request. JA196. Thus, contrary to
the district court’s assertion that “the act of soliciting money in certain amounts, by
itself, does not warrant strong First Amendment protection—even if it is for the
purpose of later engaging in protected speech,” JA245, solicitations of people

- 42 -

outside of the restricted class are vital to the Leadership Fund’s and the general
public’s First Amendment rights.
In any event, the solicitation prohibition does not comport with the First
Amendment under any level of scrutiny for much the same reasons that the
contribution prohibitions are unconstitutional. The district court identified two
potential interests that the government sought to protect through the solicitation
prohibition: the anti-corruption interest and the anti-coercion interest. Neither
justifies prohibiting an organization from soliciting funds to engage in independent
expenditures.
B.

The Solicitation Prohibition Does Not Further The AntiCorruption Interest.

For similar reasons to those stated above, solicitation restrictions do not
further the anti-corruption interest. Solicitation restrictions are another form of
source restrictions. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. And as discussed
previously, source restrictions for funding non-contribution expenditures do not
give rise to actual or perceived corruption of a candidate. See, infra, § II.B. Thus,
because the anti-corruption interest cannot justify restrictions on non-contribution
expenditures or the sources of funds for non-contribution expenditures, it follows
that it also does not apply to restrictions on solicitation restrictions for funding to
make non-contribution expenditures.
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The district court, however, incorrectly relied upon NRWC—which involved
a challenge to § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i)’s prohibition on an SSF soliciting beyond the
membership of its restricted class—to justify the solicitation prohibition based on
the anti-corruption interest. See JA246-47. NRWC does not control this case, and
the anti-corruption interest is not implicated despite the district court’s assertion
otherwise.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court specifically addressed and limited
NRWC’s holding to restrictions on solicitations for funds that would finance direct
contributions to candidates. See id. at 909 (finding that NRWC was of little
relevance because NRWC was “no more than . . . a restriction on a corporation’s
ability to solicit funds for its segregated PAC, which made direct contributions to
candidates” while Citizens United was challenging only independent
expenditures—not restrictions on direct contributions ). And the Leadership
Fund’s proposed solicitation is for funding non-contribution expenditures only.
Indeed, in light of Citizens United, NRWC is not persuasive authority. It
wrongly assumed that identity-based distinctions are permissible. See NRWC, 459
U.S. at 210-211. The Court in Citizens United cited it as the first case to rely on a
“flawed historical account of campaign finance laws” to begin deviating from the
rules in Buckley and Bellotti. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912. And NRWC
relied on two justifications—the anti-distortion interest and the shareholder
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protection interest, see NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-08—that the Supreme Court has
since rejected. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904-08 (rejecting the antidistortion interest); id. at 911 (rejecting the shareholder protection interest).
Therefore, both the holding and the reasoning of NRWC are inapposite in this case.
Accordingly, First Amendment protections against solicitation prohibitions
are the same as those for contribution prohibitions and independent expenditure
prohibitions—the only cognizable government interest is preventing actual or
apparent quid pro quo anti-corruption. And the anti-corruption interest is not
implicated because the related speech is, by definition, not coordinated with a
candidate’s campaign.
C.

The Solicitation Prohibition Does Not Further An Anti-Coercion
Interest.

The district court concluded that the prohibition protected a different interest
as well: an anti-coercion interest. Preventing employees from being coerced into
contributing to a political committee may be a legitimate governmental interest
justifying restrictions on speech within the workplace, but the Court need not
decide that question because such an interest is not implicated by the solicitation
prohibition as applied here.
The purported concern about employee coercion in the campaign finance
context is that an employer will use its economic power to compel employees to
contribute. JA247-49. The restrictions on soliciting employees allegedly prevent
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compulsion by forcing solicitations to be made in a way to prevent any implicitly
threatening situations. JA248-49. Solicitations of the restricted class must be
made by written letter to the employees’ residences, and the restrictions make it
difficult to track who does, and does not respond to the solicitation. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(3)(B). Because the regulations remove the potential of a corporation
coercing employees in the workplace, the narrow focus of anti-coercion interest is
preventing threats of retaliation. On top of these constraints, the Act renders
coercion illegal. The paragraph immediately before the solicitation ban prohibits
separate segregated funds from using any financial resource “secured by physical
force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job
discrimination, or financial reprisals.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A). None of this
would be upset by ruling in the Leadership Fund’s favor.
EMILY’s List similarly involved solicitation restrictions. If a solicitation
expressed an intent that the money would be used in support of a “clearly
identified candidate or party,” it was subject to contribution limitations. See
EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 17-18. That burden was qualitatively and quantitatively
less restrictive than the solicitation prohibition here because EMILY’s List could
solicit a much broader group and had broad freedom to tailor its message. But this
Court still concluded that the provision at issue in EMILY’S List violated the First
Amendment. Because EMILY’s List was entitled to raise unlimited funds, it had a
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First Amendment right to solicit people without the government dictating the form
or scope of its message. See id. at 18. (“Non-profits are entitled to raise money for
their soft-money accounts to help support their preferred candidates, yet this
regulation prohibits non-profits from saying as much in their solicitations.”) The
Court supported that conclusion, in part, with the principle that a “provision that
requires choice between ‘unfettered political speech’ and ‘discriminatory
fundraising limitations’ violates the First Amendment.” Id. at 18 (citing Davis,
554 U.S. at 726). And that is exactly what the solicitation restriction here imposes.
Moreover, allowing the solicitations the Leadership Fund seeks would not
have any coercive effect on members of the restricted class. All that would result
from the Leadership Fund having a separate non-contribution account is that the
Leadership Fund would create general advertisements and directly solicit members
of the general public who are not members of the restricted class. Of course, an
employee would not be coerced by hearing a radio advertisement, seeing an
internet advertisement, or otherwise running across general advertising. If the
employee does not want to see or hear the message, the employee may stop
watching or listening to it. Unlike directed solicitations, the employee has no
social or employment obligation to be solicited. And without a targeting or
tracking mechanism, the employer cannot retaliate when employees choose to tune
out.
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Direct solicitations of third parties likewise do not implicate the anticoercion interest. Restricted class members need not even be aware of the
Leadership Fund’s targeted solicitations of third parties; without such knowledge,
it would be impossible for these solicitations to affect the employees, much less
coerce them. Even if anti-coercion was a legitimate interest, it could only be
achieved through the narrow restraint on targeting communications to nonrestricted class employees.
The district court, however, concluded that the anti-coercion interest applied
here and justified the solicitation prohibition. JA247-49. In so concluding, the
court conflated the employee coercion interest with the discredited anti-distortion
and equalization interests. It cited Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United,
discussing the anti-distortion interest and then stated that “allowing unlimited
amplification of corporate political speech will also inevitably chill the political
speech of corporate employees whose views diverge from their corporate
employers.” JA247-48. The government may not, however, restrict one party’s
speech in order to enhance the voice of others. Davis, 554 U.S. at 742.
Therefore, because the solicitation prohibition does not further the anticoercion interest, that interest cannot support restricting the Leadership Fund’s
First Amendment rights under any level of scrutiny. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 696.
And, under strict scrutiny as would apply to any restriction on solicitations in
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furtherance of non-contribution speech, the solicitation prohibition would be too
broadly tailored to permissibly serve the anti-coercion interest.
Moreover, under the “closely drawn” tailoring of intermediate scrutiny or
narrow tailoring of strict scrutiny, the solicitation prohibition runs far afield of any
reasonable demarcation of an appropriate infringement on speech and association
to meet a government need. The Leadership Fund is absolutely prohibited from
discussing a topic with all but a select few individuals. In fact, the only people the
Leadership Fund may talk to are the ones actually at risk for coercion. This
scheme prohibits far more speech than is necessary to protect the employees from
being coerced, failing the closely drawn standard and the over-inclusive prong of
narrow tailoring.
The district court did not correctly analyze whether the solicitation
prohibition was narrowly tailored. Instead of comparing the burden on speakers’
constitutionally protected rights with the government’s purported interests, it
balanced the burden on speech against an alleged benefit that Congress conferred.
JA249 (“The solicitation restrictions in § 441b are also narrowly drawn to serve the
foregoing governmental interests because the restrictions are tailored to match the
special benefit that Congress extended SSFs—exempting all funds used for the
‘establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a [SSF]” from
the definition of ‘contributions.’”)). Tailoring under either strict scrutiny or
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intermediate scrutiny is not concerned with the benefit the government provides,
only its justification for any speech restriction.8
The district court’s analysis of burden imposed on speech here is particularly
problematic because of what it means for future cases. Under its theory, the
government can restrict speech as much as it likes so long as it provides a
countervailing “special benefit.” For example, Congress could grant nonconnected political committees or other associations the same “special benefit” that
it grants SSFs and that would be a sufficient basis to prohibit them from soliciting
the general public. If the government can strip constitutional rights by granting
purportedly offsetting statutory benefits, no speaker is safe from Congress’s
generosity.
The Leadership Fund has a right to raise unlimited funds for its noncontribution expenditures. The restrictions on solicitation go beyond merely
dictating the form of message to entirely prohibiting the message. Because the
prohibition does not further any government anti-corruption or anti-coercion

8

The Leadership Fund also takes issue with calling the contribution exemption a
“special benefit,” much less one that is evenly balanced against a debilitating
limitation on non-contribution expenditures that supposedly offsets it. The district
court seems to presume that the lack of speech regulation is a “special benefit,”
when in reality it should be the beginning point. When the government regulates
speech, it must justify regulation; the speaker does not have to explain why the
government should let it speak.
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interests, the restriction has no legitimate justification and must be invalidated as
applied to the Leadership Fund.
IV.

THE LEADERSHIP FUND DID NOT WAIVE ITS SECTION 441b(a)
CHALLENGE.
The district court wrongly concluded that the Leadership Fund had not

properly stated a claim for relief from 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). The relevant part of
§ 441b(a) reads, “It is unlawful for any . . . corporation organized by authority of
any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election to political office . . . or for any . . . political committee . . . to accept or
receive any contribution prohibited by this section.” The Leadership Fund wishes
to receive contributions from corporate contributors and to solicit corporate
contributors. Glengary LLC wishes to make contributions. This section prohibits
that.
The District Court acknowledged that the Leadership Fund objected to the
application of § 441b(a) in this case, but concluded that “[b]ecause the plaintiffs
only mention this provision in passing, the Court does not construe the plaintiffs’
Complaint to state a claim for relief against that provision, and the Court will not
further address § 441b(a) in this opinion.” JA213 n.2. Particularly relevant for the
Court was the absence of an explicit challenge to § 441b(a) in the prayer for relief.
Id.
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But the prayer for relief did contain a challenge to § 441b(a). The
Complaint uses the term of art “Carey contributions” and defines it as
“contributions not subject to the limits of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3)
or the source prohibitions of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) to finance independent
expenditures.” JA5. In the prayer for relief, the plaintiffs then request injunctive
relief as to prohibitions on “Carey contributions” three times. JA23-24. Indeed,
the Leadership Fund’s challenge to § 441b(a) was much more than just “passing.”
The opening paragraph of the Leadership Fund’s Complaint explicitly states that it
challenges the application of § 441b(a). JA5. So though the Leadership Fund did
not write out the phrase “§ 441b(a)” in its causes of action or prayer for relief, it
referenced the provision by defining the term “Carey contributions” in the opening
paragraph and using that term repeatedly in the prayer for relief. The challenge to
§ 441b(a) was not waived.
Moreover, there was no unfair surprise to the Commission or the court
resulting from the inclusion of § 441b(a) in the definition of “Carey account” and
incorporating it by reference. The Leadership Fund consistently and explicitly
requested that the district court enjoin the source restrictions in § 441b(a) with
respect to corporate contributions in other litigation documents. JA88, 96-97, 99,
102, 121, 125 (challenging § 441b(a) in the Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction); JA170, 184 (reiterating its
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challenge in the Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction); JA207 (reiterating its challenge in Plaintiff’s Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss); see also JA93 (not challenging the source
restrictions with respect to “national banks, federal contractors, or foreign
nationals”). And in responding to the Leadership Fund’s requests, the Commission
acknowledged that the specific validity of § 441b(a) was at stake. JA134, 136
(discussing § 441b(a) as applied to the Leadership Fund and Stop This Insanity,
Inc. in the Defendant’s Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction); JA209 (declaring that § 441b(a) would apply to contributions by
corporations to a political committee).
Section 441b(a)’s prohibition on corporate contributions is related to all of
the other challenged prohibitions on contributions and solicitations to SSFs. It
violates the First Amendment as applied here for the same reasons the other
prohibitions violate the First Amendment. In light of the fact that the challenge to
§ 441b(a) was not waived, the Court should declare it invalid as applied here just
as it should with respect to the other sections impeding the Leadership Fund’s right
to engage in non-contribution expenditures.
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE
LEADERSHIP FUND’S REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION.
“Because the FEC’s business is to censor, there inheres the danger that [it]

may well be less responsive than a court . . . to the constitutionally protected
interests in free expression.’” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (quoting
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965)). The Leadership Fund
deserves court protection now because the right to engage in political speech is not
a boon to be awarded or restricted at the grace of the Commission or Congress.
Rather, it is a fundamental right of every person that may not be restricted under
the First Amendment absent a narrowly-tailored restriction that furthers a
compelling government interest.
To warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the Leadership Fund must show
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would
not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest
would be furthered by the injunction. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v.
England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). When there is a strong likelihood of
success on the merits, a preliminary injunction is more appropriate. See Mills v.
District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2009). And anytime a
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plaintiff suffers a constitutional violation, irreparable harm is established. See
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); accord Mills, 571 F.3d at 1312.
The Leadership Fund established a strong likelihood of success above. The
government has no interest in prohibiting the Leadership Fund from opening and
fully utilizing a non-contribution bank account.
The prohibition against the account has caused, and will continue to cause
irreparable harm. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at
373. Under the contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441b, the
Leadership Fund may not solicit and accept unlimited contributions in order to
conduct independent expenditures. These directly infringe and chill the Leadership
Fund’s First Amendment rights. And the consequences of denying the injunction
are certain and direct. There is no need to speculate about whether they will or will
not occur; they have occurred. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d
at 301 (stating that “[w]here a plaintiff alleges injury from a rule or regulation that
directly limits speech, the irreparable nature of the harm may be presumed”).
For similar reasons, the balance of equities weighs in favor of the Leadership
Fund. The Supreme Court has made clear that in any conflict between First
Amendment rights and regulation, courts “must give the benefit of any doubt to
protecting rather stifling speech,” and that “the tie goes to the speaker, not the
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censor.” WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469, 474. Thus, although the injunction would “force
the FEC to ignore congressionally mandated limits on the fundraising activities of
SSFs,” JA252, under the Supreme Court’s approach to First Amendment rights in
WRTL, the Commission’s interest simply cannot trump the First Amendment rights
of the Leadership Fund. And an injunction will not harm the Commission. The
Supreme Court “has long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace
for the clash of differing views and conflicting ideas. That concept has been stated
and restated almost since the Constitution was drafted.” Citizens Against Rent
Control, 454 U.S. at 295.
Finally, a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. Removing
the contribution and solicitation restraints on the Leadership Fund’s full-throated
speech is in the public interest. “Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy,
for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. The right of citizens
to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quotation and marks omitted). Indeed, the First
Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office.” Id. Accordingly, the First Amendment reflects our
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
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be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
The Leadership Fund wishes to participate in the marketplace of ideas by
attempting to convince citizens to support candidates who share its views and to
oppose candidates who do not. “[T]here is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs . . . includ[ing] discussion of candidates.” Mills, 384 U.S. at
218. Thus, “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. In short, Plaintiffs’ activities are at the
core of the First Amendment and should be protected with a preliminary
injunction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Leadership Fund and other appellants
respectably request that this Court reverse the district court’s order dismissing this
case and denying a preliminary injunction, and direct that the district court enter a
preliminary injunction enjoining the contribution limits contained in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(C), the source prohibitions at § 441b(a), the solicitation restrictions at
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§ 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) and all related regulatory requirements as they apply to the
Appellants.
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/s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge
Counsel for Appellants
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2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1): Except as provided in subsection (i) of this section and
section 441a-1 of this title, no person shall make contributions…
(C) to any other political committee (other than a committee described in
subparagraph (D)) in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000;
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3): During the period which begins on January 1 of an oddnumbered year and ends on December 31 of the next even-numbered year, no
individual may make contributions aggregating more than-(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to candidates and the authorized
committees of candidates;
(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of which not more than
$37,500 may be attributable to contributions to political committees which are not
political committees of national political parties.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a): In general—
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of
any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or
political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or
for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which presidential and vice
presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the
foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person
knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any
officer or any director of any corporation or any national bank or any officer of any
labor organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation,
national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this section.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A): Except as provided in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D),
it shall be unlawful—
(i) for a corporation, or a separate segregated fund established by a
corporation, to solicit contributions to such a fund from any person other than its
stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and
their families, and
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(ii) for a labor organization, or a separate segregated fund established by a
labor organization, to solicit contributions to such a fund from any person other
than its members and their families.
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